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The majority of current citizenship debates focus on the ways in which diasporic and 
migrant communities affect the citizenship regime in their country of settlement. In 
contrast, the papers in this special issue focus on the relationship between the sending 
state and its diasporic communities abroad. In so doing, the contributions seek to 
delink understandings of citizenship from state territoriality. The articles assembled 
here stress that both sending, or kin-states and diasporic people actively engage in the 
process of revising the meaning of citizenship. They demonstrate important ways in 
which diasporas impact on the delineation of citizenship regimes and the politics of 
national identity in their homeland. They also trace the salience of ethnic and cultural 
markers in diaspora politics and their implications for the articulations and practices 
of citizenship.  
 
Every nationalist variant, whether terrorist, democratic or ‘banal’,i pursues the 
political goal of embodying its interpretation of the nation through territory, 
institutions and in some cases, the national diaspora. Furthermore, and as the name 
‘nation-state’ suggests, a sense of national belonging represents one of the key 
sources of legitimacy and loyalty for states. Indeed, the nation has been described as 
“the ultimate object of competition for loyalty”.ii Whereas the state is legally able to 
command this loyalty to some extent,
iii
 sub-state nationalists and the like must 
mobilise loyal support in their quest to undermine the legitimacy of the existing link 
between nation and state. Many of the debates surrounding diasporas and their politics 
also turn on the issue of loyalty. For instance, this slippery concept pervades the 
question of citizenship, which is currently so closely tied to nation-statehood that it 
can be considered the legal expression of national belonging. Citizenship continues to 
be regarded as a badge of loyalty to the nation-state, as exemplified in ceremonies 
involving oath-taking, or the practice of stripping political exiles of their citizenship. 
Put another way, loyalty is seen as one of the duties of citizenship, in return for state 
rights, security and protection.  
 
Governments have always had to manage migration, respond to the influence of 
international diaspora, or attempt to co-opt supranational trading systems into their 
nation-building efforts. Indeed, the ebb and flow of modern history has much to do 
with states’ relative success at affording representation and quelling revolt amongst 
the masses and minorities alike. Yet twenty-first century nation-states are faced with a 
unique set of challenges. Migration and diaspora now create cultural, economic, social 
and virtual networks which bind people across entire continents, let alone countries. 
Faced with competing claims for their national loyalty, individuals are urged to 
choose one overriding national allegiance. In states which do not allow dual 
citizenship, for instance, bidding for loyalty is something of a zero-sum game. What 
nation-states’ evolving relationship with their respective diasporas suggests, however, 
is that nation-states themselves are looking beyond their territorial boundaries in order 
to draw those they deem co-nationals into a new sphere of influence. This has resulted 
in states playing an active role in “reconfiguring traditional understandings of 
sovereignty, nation and citizenship”.iv The suggestion here is that the quality of 
citizenship is changing, and that diasporas have an important part to play in shaping 
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new shades of belonging and their legal expression. For example, despite the fact that 
the Indian constitution does not ban naturalised, as opposed to ‘natural born’ Indians 
from holding the highest offices in the land, there was a political outcry against Sonia 
Gandhi, the Italian-born head of India’s Congress Party, becoming prime minister in 
1999. The suggestion was that she could not possibly be sufficiently patriotic. 
Conversely, India accords a whole range of rights short of citizenship to its diaspora 
(See Xavier in this issue). These contrasting examples show that in India “citizenship 
and nationality, although used interchangeably in common legal parlance, are not one 
and the same thing”.v It also illustrates how India is responding to its diaspora by 
delinking markers of belonging from the territorial boundaries of the state.  
 
Diaspora as a relational process 
 
Diasporas have been extensively studied as historical and social phenomena in their 
own right and also in relation to their host and sending societies.
vi
 Studies on diaspora 
have focused on the agency of diasporic communities in negotiating their relationship 
with their homeland, host societies, and co-ethnics in other regions.
vii
 Pioneering work 
by Robin Cohen defined diaspora by the strong attachment of its members to 
homeland.
viii
 Cohen argued that members of a diaspora share memories of a past, 
idealised or even imagined home, and a common bond to the country they or their 
forebears left behind. Furthermore, diasporas have been viewed as ‘independent 
actors’ involved with the politics of the ancestral homeland,ix actively creating 
homeland in an affective and temporal process.
x
 They have also been characterised as 
de-territorialised ethnic groups, with the link to the homeland facilitated by advances 
in international transport and communications.
xi
 This homeland link, together with a 
relatively established and cohesive community abroad, has served as a distinguishing 
factor between members of a diaspora and individual migrants, who may retain no ties 
to their country of origin. 
 
Not all migrants belong to a diaspora, because they might not identify with their 
country of origin, or homeland. Neither can we assume that a diaspora represents a 
homogenous group. On the contrary, we can detect “the presence of both 
cosmopolitan anti-nationalists and reactionary ethno-nationalists within diasporas”.xii 
The impact of diaspora and extraterritoriality affects both ‘host’ and ‘home’ nation-
states. On the one hand, members of a diaspora might feel and express their sense of 
belonging to their (ancestral) homeland in different ways, be it through upholding its 
cultural customs and traditions, some form of political activism, or economic 
solidarity in providing remittances and other forms of financial support. They will 
have other identities, including perhaps several national allegiances. With respect to 
contemporary nation-states, the growing number of countries which allow dual 
citizenship testifies to a gradual acceptance of ‘divided loyalties’, not least in order to 
ease the flow of remittances and investment. Countries like India and Vietnam have 
been courting their respective diaspora communities in recent decades, and the 
economies of the Philippines, Mexico, and Egypt are heavily dependent on 
remittances. At times when political and economic upheavals challenge their 
authority, governments can also find ways of overcoming the territorial limitations to 
their governance through extending national membership to their populations abroad. 
Thus, Britain embraced the idea of dual citizenship to protect its nationals abroad at 
the end of its colonial reign and Greece actively promoted the idea of Greek diaspora 
during its struggle for independence (see Vogli in this issue). Russia undertook a 
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similar step of allowing dual citizenship to Russians and Russian-speakers with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, in order to ‘protect’ its diaspora living in the new 
independent states (see Kosmarskaya in this issue).  
 
By contrast, the disadvantages for nation-states of ‘hosting’ a diaspora include 
uncertainty surrounding military service and readiness to defend the nation in times of 
crisis, more diffuse concerns about (inter)national security and stability, and worries 
about diaspora members’ willingness to engage fully with their country of residence 
by actively contributing to its culture and society. To some extent, these concerns are 
shared by those ‘home’ countries which grant political rights to their own diaspora (as 
in the case of India, discussed by Xavier in this issue). This rests on the problematic 
assumption that citizenship or diaspora identities necessarily reflect a clear sense of 
commitment and solidarity to a single, specific community. Linked to this, John Kelly 
criticises Benedict Anderson’s influential view of national communities, as 
“symmetrical units of imagined, communal self-love”xiii, because such an 
understanding suggests a horizontal leveling of individuals through notions of 
national solidarity and comradeship, when this is belied by the hierarchies that 
pervaded colonial rule and often persisted thereafter. It can also detract attention from 
the upheaval of diasporic movement, and cases in which diasporas are denied an equal 
role in their ‘host’ countries. For example, Kelly cites the case of Indo-Fijians. 
Brought by British colonialists to the Pacific Islands as indentured labourers in the 
nineteenth century, their descendants still remain subordinate to the constitutional 
principle of ethnic Fijian paramountcy. These tensions are due in no small part to the 
legacy of colonialism. This applies both to postcolonial states and former colonising 
countries, whose own national identities continue to be influenced by decolonisation. 
Most obviously, countries like the United Kingdom and France have been shaped by 
migration and diaspora from former colonies. This durable legacy of colonialism has 
also contributed to diasporas having been largely perceived as more or less stable 
groups with a common cultural identity.  
 
The prevailing, culturally bounded understanding of diaspora has been recurrently 
questioned by an increasing number of studies. Rogers Brubaker proposes to view 
diaspora instead as a ‘category of practice remaking rather than describing the 
world’.xiv In a similar vein, cultural theorists Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy suggest that 
diasporic identity is best understood as a political stance expressed through individual 
or group identities.
xv
 Rather than focusing on diaspora as a discrete homogenous 
community, glossing over the internal differences and tensions, Rhacel Parreñas and 
Lok Siu stress the need to account for ruptures within and across diasporic 
connections along the markers of race, ethnicity, sexuality and class.
xvi
 Collectively, 
these authors call for more empirical studies on the triadic relationship between the 
members of diaspora, homeland, and host society, in order better to understand the 
processes of transnational and national identity formation. One common, distinctive 
aspect of diasporic identity is that members of diaspora (or indeed individual 
migrants) are only marginally included in both their host society and their ‘home’. Yet 
diaspora as a discursive tool, a form of practice and a political stance draws 
distinctions between self and other in the identity politics of both host and kin states, 
and is closely related to the formulation of citizenship regimes in both locations. 
Through the constant negotiation and contestations of the elements producing 
diasporic relations, the cultural and political contours of diaspora and de-
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territorialised nations are sustained. For diasporic subjects, the home is always 
somewhere else. 
 
The papers in the present issue focus on exploring one element in this triadic 
relationship, namely the dynamics of the relationship between homeland and diaspora. 
Diaspora is analysed as a political project devised and negotiated by the kin-state with 
the members of its putative diaspora. The stress is on the process of ‘diasporization’ 
through which ‘homeland’ and diaspora are mutually constituted. All of the 
contributions to the special issue concentrate on how a complex web of historical 
dynamics, political agendas, and economic interests produce and uphold diaspora as 
an object of the state’s national discourse and practices informing its citizenship 
regime. Although it is sometimes thought that the production and sustenance of 
diasporic connections is specific to Asian state-diaspora relations
xvii
 or developing 
countries,
xviii
 the cases discussed in this special issue show that practices of 
diasporization are by no means limited to a particular region or state’s economic 
condition, and have been a feature of national politics practised by states of different 
political histories, cultures, and outlooks. This is not to suggest that ‘diasporization’ is 
common to all states, yet most states resorted to diaspora engagement policies at one 
or another stage in their history. In other words, the process of constituting diaspora is 
closely linked to the never-ending process of nation-building, where the trajectories of 
national and diasporic politics complement and feed into each other. Thus the 
historical and national narratives of the state heavily rely on culturally specific 
transnational discourses and practices. 
 
 
Citizenship: Legal status and beyond  
 
Citizenship means much more than gaining a passport and escaping the legal void of 
statelessness. It comes with the accretions of European history, such as voluntary 
participation in the civic ideal of the French revolution, the covenant between ruler 
and ruled which underpins the social contract, and the basis of the democratic system 
of popular sovereignty. Citizenship evidently has an important political dimension, as 
an arena in which to define the content of people’s rights and duties vis-à-vis the state. 
It also decides rightful claimants of those rights. Indeed, “why would we need to think 
of ourselves as citizens if there were no Others who are not?”xix In a world of nation-
states, diasporas can be considered a problem because they do not fit into the equation 
of identity with territory, which underpins that global order. The idea that belonging 
entails a sense of ‘rootedness’ in a particular place is deeply ingrained in our thinking 
about nations and nationalism.
xx
 In turn, the notion of “citizenship as boundary”xxi 
translates the nation-state-territory nexus into legal language. This is one key means 
of managing the flow of people across borders.  
 
As a form of national solidarity, citizenship symbolises membership in the nation-
state. In addition to a complex package of rights and responsibilities, citizenship is a 
marker of identification dividing the society into those who belong there and those 
who belong somewhere else. Barry Hindess has recently argued that citizenship 
constitutes an aspect of a bigger governing system which functions by dividing world 
population into subpopulations with unequal citizenship rights.
xxii
 Supranational 
institutions and discourses thus impact on how the limits of citizenship are 
delineated.
xxiii
 It is, for example, the case in the most ambitious model of 
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supranational integration of our day, the European Union, where the implicit 
presumption of common Christian roots of the member states has so far complicated 
the application process for the predominantly Muslim Turkey. The irreconcilable 
tension between ethno-cultural and territorially-based, civic, underpinnings of 
citizenship is further accentuated by the fact that ethnic preference in the citizenship 
legislation of member states has not been challenged by the European Union, and the 
1997 European Convention on Nationality did not require the elimination of 
preferential provisions for co-ethnics that had already been in force before the 
adoption of the convention.
xxiv
 This is an indication of the extent of the unequivocal 
and insoluble tensions at the heart of debates on European citizenship. 
 
 
At the interface of the citizen ‘in-group’ and the immigrant ‘out-group’, naturalisation 
procedures help constitute the borders of belonging. They are thus a privileged point 
of access to contemporary interpretations of citizenship. Migration policies must also 
be alive to the likelihood of long-term residence and the eventual attainment of 
citizenship. The introduction of categories, ‘points’ systems and quotas in countries 
such as Australia and the United Kingdom are designed to reflect a migrant’s 
‘usefulness’ and potential to make a contribution to the receiving state’s society. 
Citizenship regimes, particularly naturalisation policy, are an important corollary of 
migration in that they represent the primary means of official, legal integration into a 
state. Citizenship policies are thus a fundamental aspect of nation-building and, 
ultimately, state legitimacy. The concept of stability also continues to be a key 
justification for immigrant integration and naturalisation. Today, stability refers 
explicitly to social cohesion and implicitly to national identity, the assumption being 
that it could be knocked off course or ‘denatured’ by too many foreign elements. The 
case of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia serves to illustrate this point. 
 
Although Chinese communities have settled all over Southeast Asia since the 
sixteenth century they remain at the mercy of latent racism there.
xxv
 For instance, the 
Chinese minority was long constructed as an alien ‘Other’ to a Thai nation, which in 
the early twentieth century came to be defined according to the ethnic Thai 
majority.
xxvi
 Here we encounter the issue of multiple citizenship, but this time as the 
instrumental tool of individuals, rather than as a marker of nation-state loyalty. 
Writing about the wealthy business elite within the Chinese diaspora, Aihwa Ong 
suggests that the “multiple passport holder is an apt contemporary figure; he or she 
embodies the split between state-imposed identity and personal identity caused by 
political upheavals, migration, and changing global markets”.xxvii This separation 
between state and personal identity, in turn, sums up a new conundrum for the 
Chinese state, which wants to tap into the expertise and investments of its diaspora, 
but also questions the political loyalty and patriotic motivation of its overseas 
community. Again with reference to the Chinese diaspora, Aihwa Ong shows how the 
presumption against dual citizenship long upheld in Germany, Southeast Asian 
countries and elsewhere is being undermined by those who collect passports as a form 
of ‘insurance’ against the vagaries of politics. She points to ethnic Chinese business 
elites from Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand among others, who may do business 
all over the world, but guard against a possible backlash or discriminatory policies by 
settling families in ‘safe havens’ in order to earn residency rights.xxviii  
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According to Aihwa Ong’s notion of ‘flexible citizenship’, some individuals view 
passports instrumentally in terms of status and security rather than as symbols of 
national loyalty and belonging.
xxix
 Ong also applies this flexibility to states, pointing 
out that the United States’ practice of giving green cards to large investors is one way 
of attracting global capital in return for a path to citizenship.
xxx
 In countries like 
Cambodia, citizenship has been traded as a commodity, which potential investors can 
purchase to facilitate their business dealings. Here, the equation of citizens with 
nationals qua members of a national community completely breaks down and the 
possibility of a hierarchy within citizenship emerges, whereby naturalised citizens are 
excluded from election or public office for fear that they will try to exert influence in 
their own and not the national interest.
xxxi
 Linked to this, the meaning of Cambodian 
citizenship has also been a source of tension between returning exiles – many of 
whom have dual nationality – and those who stayed behind. In this debate, citizenship 
is used as a cipher for the delicate relationship between material interests and 
overriding allegiances, with many returnees arguing that “the number of passports 
cannot measure loyalty”.xxxii Despite citizenship’s strong theoretical associations with 
equality, then, it is clear that states do not always guarantee this in practice. Rather, 
shades of citizenship are emerging, both in legal terms and in the range of meanings 




Diaspora and citizenship 
 
Although migration is by no means a new phenomenon, its implications for national 
solidarity and state citizenship have become more prevalent in recent decades. 
Originally conceived as membership in a territorially bounded political community 
sharing a common sense of culture and belonging, citizenship and its relationship with 
state territoriality have been increasingly problematized by international migration. 
The accelerated character of migration has been transforming citizenship regimes in 
seemingly contradictory directions of de-ethnicization and re-ethnicization, 
charactarized by Christian Joppke as ‘embracing emigrants, bashing immigrants’.xxxiii 
These conflicting processes take place within the same national borders, as states 
traditionally known for their out-migration, like India and Italy, extend a form of 
external membership to their overseas communities. As a result, empirical and 
normative scholars of citizenship are increasingly recognising the effects of ‘external 
citizenship’ and their de-territorialising effects.xxxiv  
 
There has been much debate as to how newcomers should be expected to participate 
in the host society. However, labels like assimilation, integration and even 
ghettoization often say more about the country of residence’s approach to nation-
building than individuals’ lived experience within a diaspora. Standards of language 
competence and naturalization requirements reflect a certain national ideal to which 
long-term residents are expected to conform, but are a poor measure of the everyday 
cultural competence which is often fostered by living a transnational life. This has 
been described as a kind of practical cosmopolitanism, or an acquired skill at 
negotiating different cultural systems and switching more or less expertly between 
them.
xxxv
 With regard to their homeland, members of a diaspora may wholeheartedly 
support it and its policies, struggle against the incumbent regime – as in the case of 
political exiles
xxxvi
 – or adopt any stance in between. In turn, the challenge for 
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contemporary nation-states lies in how to include their own diaspora – through 
extending citizenship rights, encouraging investment, remittances and the like – at the 
same time as members of other diasporas resident on their territory. In the latter case, 
this involves defining boundaries of belonging, and thereby the degree of openness or 
exclusivity of their own national construct. As a result, transnationalism raises “issues 
concerning civic order and the cohesiveness of ‘host’ societies”.xxxvii 
 
Diaspora, as a significant aspect of a wider intensification in the speed and ease of all 
forms of exchange, has led in some cases to a multiplication in ‘irregular’ identity and 
citizenship configurations (See Xavier in this issue); the “migrant has always been the 
‘Other’ of the nation…[b]ut if the Other is part of society (for example, as a worker, 
parent or taxpayer), how can national distinctiveness be maintained?”.xxxviii This is the 
dilemma facing contemporary nation-states. Multiple citizenship, denizenship, 
residence permits and domicile status are among the legal tools which have developed 
to cover cases in which residence, nationality and citizenship are not congruent. 
Some, like domicile, seek to establish an individual’s allegiance and derive from the 
default principle that citizenship should correspond to national loyalty.
xxxix
 
Citizenship tests and positive discrimination policies, such as measures favoring 
ethnic Malays in Malaysia, also follow this logic, thereby displaying the inherent 
contradiction in linking the potentially universal reach of citizenship to national 
belonging in the first place; “The principle of citizenship for all members of society 
demands the inclusion of new ethnic minorities into the political community; the 
principle of national belonging demands their exclusion”.xl  
 
 
The fluctuating borderline between the ‘in’ group and the ‘out’ group, as embodied in 
citizenship legislation and naturalisation in particular, is a key marker of how the 
concept of nation is decontested. Citizenship is a legal construct with politically 
defined nationalist content and increasingly polemical connotations linked to 
immigration and asylum. Yet Yasemin Soysal has long argued that citizenship can go 
beyond the nation-state as a legitimating basis, to be replaced with universal human 
rights principles.
xli
 A form of citizenship freed from national ties of ethnicity, culture 
or descent is also thinkable, in which residence is the ticket to political 
participation.
xlii
 According to this reading, citizenship would be an administrative tool 
to organize the polity, and require no proof of national loyalty or identity.
xliii
 
However, this underestimates the importance of citizenship in regulating national 
membership, and how its development charts the interpretation of national self-
understanding. Decoupled from the state, citizenship offers only a truncated form of 
political integration, and obviates any need for nation-building as a form of state 
legitimation. Importantly, too, it deprives the state of a key means of reaching out to 
its diaspora. On the other hand, decoupling citizenship from territory, as the extension 
of rights to diasporas tends to do, stretches the notion of ethnic belonging in a way 
which might be difficult to accept if the sending state is not similarly inclusive 
towards its residents (perhaps from other diasporas) who do not belong to the 
“dominant ethnie”.xliv Indeed, if the deterritorialized award of citizenship to diasporas 
on the basis of ethnic belonging goes hand in hand with high hurdles to naturalization 
for incoming migrants and long-term residents, then there may be a regressive aspect 





The organization of the special issue 
 
The proliferation of state power is in many respects paradoxical. In international 
milieux we see states’ dynamic initiation and participation in the supranational, global 
or regional-based formations and processes, which are opposed to narrow identity 
politics based on ethnic affiliation and national loyalty. At the same time, states 
actively endorse or tap into particular ethnic and national allegiances to serve their 
economic and political goals. Such engagements are becoming a globalizing rather 
than localizing trend; through links and connections based on ethnic affiliation, state 
power travels outside its territory to engage with transnational processes driven by 
international migration regimes. Territorially-based, nationally-bound perspectives on 
citizenship cannot fully appreciate and engage with the complexity of these processes. 
The five contributions to this special issue show how the articulation of citizenship 
can be intricately bound up with the politics of diasporization. 
 
The opening article by Elpida Vogli discusses the role of diasporic politics in the 
Greek state during its struggle for national unity and after achieving independence in 
1922. She shows how the `imaginary' conception of the Greek national state was 
constituted with the Greek diaspora in mind. Modern Greek national politics was 
aimed at actively creating and ‘preserving’ the Greek diaspora. This engagement with 
diaspora had not only to do with the role of remittances for the independence of the 
young Greek state, but was closely related to Greece’s territorial claims and 
compensation after World War II. In other words, Greece’s pursuit of diaspora and 
emigration policies has been intimately related to nation-building. Greeks abroad 
were encouraged to sustain the link with homeland through such initiatives as `Greek 
Home-Coming year', whereas ‘surplus’ population was actively produced as the new 
Greek diaspora. At the same time, Greece’s ethnic minorities were instructed how to 
behave ‘like Greeks’ through the newly promulgated Greek citizenship code.  
Somewhat similar politics of diasporization are in place in present-day India’s 
experimentation with citizenship provision for Overseas Indians, as discussed in the 
article by Constantino Xavier. Caught between the necessity of attracting overseas 
Indians’ resources for the state’s material and symbolic economy on the one hand, and 
the suspicion of ‘divided loyalty’ on the other, the Indian state found an intermediate 
solution in the form of the 2003 law on Overseas Citizenship of India for Indians of 
foreign nationality. Coined the Indian ‘green card’, it provides economic and cultural 
rights to overseas Indians short of the right of political participation. India’s Overseas 
Citizenship remains an exclusionary act negating the rights of overseas Indians who 
migrated before 1947 as a labour force to British colonies and the more recent waves 
of manual labour migrants in the Middle East. Social status and material affluence, on 
a par with ethnic affiliation, are thus important aspects delimiting the contours of 
Indian citizenship and diasporic politics. 
Natalya Kosmarskaya's article focuses on the analysis of discourses and practices of 
‘diasporization’ in contemporary Russia. She shows how Russia has viewed itself as a 
successor to the Soviet Union since its collapse, and as a ‘homeland’ to all Russian- 
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speaking citizens of the former USSR. Within this dynamic, ‘diasporization’ takes a 
socio-cultural form rather than being limited by ethnicized identity politics. In the 
case of Russia, involvement with what is deemed its Russian-speaking diaspora serves 
as an expression of Russia’s national identity crisis related to the difficulties of 
coming to terms with its post-imperial legacy. 
In her examination of the relationship between diaspora and homelands, Illa Ben- 
Porat turns to the post-Soviet case of Israel and Russia courting Russian-speaking 
Jews. She argues that it is this relationship which not only characterizes but 
constitutes the meanings of diaspora and homeland. Both home and diaspora are 
contingent notions which ‘organize rather than describe the world’. The interplay 
between the homeland and diaspora shapes the boundaries of home and diaspora. The 
state of Israel constructs itself as a homeland through exclusionary diasporic politics 
towards particular groups abroad. The Law of Return in Israel negotiates the basis of 
Israeli citizenship principles enshrined in the Jewish religious laws, thereby claiming 
Jews from the former Soviet Union republics as Israel’s diaspora. On the other hand, 
Russia resorts to diasporization practices toward Russian-speaking Jews in an attempt 
to re-define its national identity as a homeland for all former citizens of the Soviet 
Union after its collapse. It is a fascinating case, illuminating how diaspora, 
citizenship, and nation-building are mutually constitutive and interconnected in a 
complex relationship. 
The article by Ruth Wittlinger and James Koranyi draws attention to ‘perpetual’ 
diasporization in the case of Transylvanian Saxons and their troubled relationship 
with their dual home in Romania and Germany. Unlike other contributions stressing 
the state discourses and practices of diasporization, here diasporization is taken up by 
the migrant minority group as a form of citizenship practice. This article shows how 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc and German citizenship reforms in the 1990s, which 
partially changed the jus sanguinis principle in favour of jus soli, were precursors for 
Transylvanian Saxon immigrants in Germany to actively evoke Transylvania as their 
new ‘external homeland.’ This is not merely an act of memory and nostalgia for the 
past, but ‘physical constitution’ of and engagement with the homeland as an 
inalienable process of minorities’ identity negotiation. Diasporization is thus an 
integral and dynamic process defining the relationship between majority-minority 
groups. 
                                                 

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